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Abstract
Malaysia can be classifi ed as a Muslim country. With its Muslim majority 
and Islam as its offi  cial religion, Malaysia takes considerable pride for 
being part of the dynamic and progressive Islamic Ummah. Being part 
of the Ummah, Malaysia endeavors her utmost to manifest her concern 
and commitment to the Islamic principles of brotherhood and justice. 
Islam plays an important part in the national life, as it is closely linked 
to the ethnic identity of the politically dominant Malays. Consequently, 
the foreign policy of Malaysia may be said to be aff ected by Islam to a 
considerable degree.  e primary concern of this paper is to examine 
Malaysia’s commitment to Islam and Islamic cause, as refl ected in its 
foreign policy. It is also, in a way, an attempt to identify the prime mover 
of Malaysian foreign policy.  is paper, argues that Islam has never been 
an overriding factor in Malaysia’s support for Islamic issues. Malaysian’s 
role in this respect was largely motivated by pragmatic considerations 
resulting from an interplay between various factors; political, economic, 
religious and humanitarian.
INTRODUCTION 
Malaya gained its independence on August 31, 1957. According the 
new Merdeka Constitution, Islam was made for the fi rst time the offi  cial 
religion (Sheridan & Groves, 1967) for the entire Federation, including 
Penang and Malacca as well as the Malay states. Article 3(2) provides 
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that the Malay states’ rulers will be in charge of Islam in their states. 
But in the states of Penang and Malacca, where there is no dynastic rule, 
governors of these states are not entrusted with religious responsibility. 
Instead, this duty is assumed by the Yang DiPertuan Agong who acts as 
the ruling Monarch for the federation as a whole.
From a historical study of Malay politics, one may notice that Islam has 
increasingly become a vital political force because of its signifi cance to 
communal and political identity of the Malay-Muslims (Nair, Shanti 
1997). According to the Constitution of Malaysia, Malay means “a 
person who professes the Muslim religion, speaks the Malay language 
and conforms to Malay customs”.1 ! is defi nition clearly signifi es a 
strong correlation between religion and ethnicity in Malaysian polity, 
thus paving the way for the emergence of Islam as a potent political force 
in Malaysia domestically and internationally. 
 
Signifi cantly, Islam represents a symbol of legitimacy for the ruling Malay 
party, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). Since its 
formation under the leadership of Malaysia’s fi rst Prime Minister, Tunku 
Abdul Rahman, UMNO has been successful in providing guidelines 
for Malaysian Islamic diplomacy. Islam, with the passage of time, 
gained greater role in the politics of Malaysia as a result of serious and 
deepening intra-Malay rivalry, particularly between UMNO and PAS 
(Parti Islam Se-Malaysia). ! erefore, UMNO under the leadership of 
successive Prime Ministers has continued its commitment to use Islam as 
an important policy tool to help, protect, promote and secure Malaysia’s 
national interests within the international world of Islam.
Indeed, Islam, as a bastion of Malay identity, has considerably infl uenced 
the domestic policies of the Malaysian government. ! e exact degree to 
which Islam infl uences Malaysian foreign policy has yet to be investigated, 
but it is reasonable to assume that such an important component in the 
national life and character of the Malays do have some infl uences. Since 
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Islam plays a remarkable role in the national life, it should inevitably 
exert considerable infl uence in its external attitudes and polities. 
ISLAM IN MALAYSIAN FOREIGN POLICY: AN OVERVIEW
! e foreign policy of Malaysia has been since the fi rst days of 
independence directly and consistently engaged in the promotion of 
friendly and cooperative relations among nations in order to achieve a 
just and safe international order, and to promote the struggle against 
imperialism, racism and human misery (Shafi e, Ghazali 1982).
Malaysia believes that every state must be allowed to choose for itself 
its own form of political, economic and social organizations, free from 
any manner of external interference. Malaysia’s commitment to the 
principle of international peace and justice may be best illustrated by its 
constructive support for the nationalist struggle for freedom and justice, 
e.g. the cases of the black South Africans, Bosnians and Palestinians. 
In a democratic country like Malaysia, foreign policy must refl ect 
the aspirations of the people for peace, security and development. As 
discussed earlier, Islam plays an important part in the national life, as it is 
closely linked to the ethnic identity of the politically dominant Malays. 
! erefore, Islam is an important factor in contemporary Malaysian 
politics, especially in mobilizing the Malays for political action, and in 
the formulation of foreign policy.
Islam, being the offi  cial religion of the country, is thus protected and 
subsidized. Signifi cantly, Islam has for long been a component of Malay 
political culture, and thus represented a symbol of legitimacy for the 
ruling Malay party, UMNO, from its formation. Commenting on the 
importance of Islam in Malay culture and Malay politics, it is by no means 
an exaggeration to suggest that religion and religious consideration are of 
great importance in the foreign policy making of Malaysia.
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Islam is certainly a unifying force in the Malay community as well as 
among the Islamic world community. ! is feeling of kinship in Islam is, 
therefore an attitude of mind, which if not exercising undue infl uence 
on Malaysian foreign policy formulation, will at least be taken into 
account when evaluating foreign policy alternatives in order to achieve 
the realization of a particular national aim (Widdowson 1976).
Malaysia being a Muslim country with a sizable Muslim population 
and Islam as its offi  cial religion would have to show special concern and 
support to Muslim aff airs and issues throughout the world. ! e spirit of 
ummatism, which advocates one single integrated Muslim community 
unseparated by boundaries of race and worldly ideologies, has made 
possible the gathering of Muslim countries in a number of organizations, 
such as the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). Malaysia is 
indeed by no means an exception.
Malaysia’s emphasis on the co-religionists’ issues could be seen in her fi rm 
stands on the Palestinian issue, the Russian aggression on Afghanistan, 
the Gulf war, the confl ict in Bosnia and the struggle of Muslim minorities 
in Southeast Asia. On the OIC as well as the UN levels, we note Malaysia 
uncompromising support to all Islamic gatherings and causes.
! e basic premises for Malaysian Islamic diplomacy were certainly laid 
down by the fi rst Prime Minister of Malaysia who was also the fi rst 
Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). 
Since the era of the fi rst Prime Minister, Malaysia has actively supported 
the cause of Islamic nations, particularly on the platform of the OIC, 
and courageously voiced out the Ummatic causes in the UN gatherings. 
In many occasions, Malaysia has contributed much in terms of providing 
ideas and suggesting solutions with respect to issues aff ecting the Ummah, 
and the world community at large. 
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  e feeling of Islamic brotherhood triggered the Malaysian government 
to involve itself in important Islamic issues such as the Palestinian issue, 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Bosnian confl ict, the Iran-
Iraq war and the problem of Muslim minorities in Southeast Asia. 
  e Islamic-Ummatic orientation of Malaysia has become the basic 
motivation for Malaysia to support the Islamic cause.  is could be best 
exemplifi ed by the Palestinian cause, which is perhaps the oldest and 
the most pronounced Islamic issue to the Malaysian government. All 
the Malaysian Premiers have contributed signifi cantly to the Palestinian 
struggle, morally, materially and through other means.
Malaysia’s preoccupation with the Palestinian issue is perhaps the earliest 
among other Islamic issues. Malaysia’s stand towards the Palestinian 
struggle and the Zionist regime could be noticed ever since the early 
days of independence under the premiership of the fi rst Prime Minister 
of Malaysia.  
Another Islamic-humanitarian issue that gained much attention from 
the Malaysian government was the plight of the Afghan Muslims who 
were victims of the Soviet aggression.2  e armed Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 was formally condemned by a vast 
majority of the UN member states, including Malaysia, as an act violating 
the principle of international conduct as enshrined in the UN Charter. 
  e concept of Islamic fraternity was another factor that motivated the 
Malaysian government to support the Afghan cause.
One important event that paved the way for a growing attention to 
Islam in Malaysian government policies in the late sixties under the 
administration of Tunku Abdul Rahman, was the occurrence of the riots 
of May 13, 1969 (Camber 1983).  ey led to a growing Malay-Islamic 
re-assertiveness and hence, as far as foreign policy is concerned, were 
instrumental in a slight change in favor of Islam and the Muslim nations. 
  e May riots, later described by Tunku as the ‘darkest period in our 
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national history’, were, doubtless, a serious blow to the government’s 
image, and especially to UMNO. ! ey were, therefore, encouraged to 
enhance their participation and strengthen their association with the 
International Islamic community in order to boost their image and regain 
the confi dence of the Malay-Muslim population in particular.
It is Important to highlight that the outbreak of the Arab-Israel 
war of 1967, resulted in the major change in the policy of Malaysian 
government toward Israel. Since then, the Palestinian issue became one 
of the favorite topics in the Malaysian dailies3 and in Parliament4. ! e 
withdrawal of the proposal to recognize Israel in 1967 was justifi ed by 
the Deputy Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, in the following words, 
“to change the political status quo of the region through force of military 
might is an anachronism and militates against a cardinal tenet of the 
United Nations”5. ! us Malaysia’s conviction in the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of states, and its opposition to acts of terrorism 
was apparently the major reason for its refusal to recognize the Israeli 
regime. ! is change of attitude was presumably also partly motivated by 
the heightened domestic pressure. For instance, several UMNO branch 
resolutions urged the review of the recognition proposal in order “to keep 
up the good name of Malaya among Muslim countries in the Middle 
East”6. 
Prior to 1969, the Islamic consideration had apparently had an impact 
on the formulation of the Malaysian foreign policy. ! e Malaysian 
government believed that the issue was essentially a political one. It is 
important to highlight that early Malaysia’s support for the Palestinian 
cause was more of a political nature, but partly as well a gesture of support 
for the co-religionists. 
Another major landmark, perhaps that most important factor for the 
subsequent drastic change in the Malaysian government attitude and 
role towards the Islamic issue, was the arson of Al-Aqsa mosque on 
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August 21, 1969. Since then, Malaysia’s support for the Palestinian cause 
was very much supportive and vigorous. In one of its statement on the 
problem, the Malaysian government pledged Malaysia’s support for 
the Arab cause “until justice has been done for the Arabs”7. Noticeably, 
the arson led to the reenergizing of Islam in the International arena 
through the holding of the fi rst Islamic Summit Conference in Rabat. 
Simultaneously Islam has increasingly infl uenced the foreign policies of 
the Malaysian government who, since 1969, acted in concert with fellow 
Muslim countries within the OIC over the Palestinian issue.
Tunku Abdul Rahman himself attended the Islamic Summit. His speech 
on the occasion suggested that Islam had already become an important 
pillar of Malaysian foreign policy. In his address, Tunku stressed that the 
Palestinian issue was actually an Islamic issue. He stated:
“I have come here as a brother in Islam, moved by my very deep 
concern and anxiety for the holy places of Jerusalem. We are all here 
at this gathering not as so called Arab Muslim or non Arab Muslims, 
but simply as brothers in Islam.  e future is not a matter between 
Israel and Jordan only, or even between Israel and the other Arab 
states only. It is a matter of deepest concern to us all as Muslims”.8
Malaysia regional Islamic profi le has been maintained through her active 
participation at the non-governmental level, and in regional gatherings, 
to promote solidarity and cooperation among regional Muslim states. In 
1981 for instance, Tunku Abdul Rahman was appointed the President of 
the RISEAP (Regional Islamic Dakwah Council for Southeast Asia and 
the Pacifi c)9. ! e headquarter of this organization and a training center 
were subsequently established in Kuala Lumpur to promote greater non-
government cooperation in Islamic matters among the various regional 
Islamic organizations, and in June 1982, Kuala Lumpur was the venue of 
the fi rst General Assembly of RISEAP. At this conference, Dr. Mahathir 
reiterated Malaysia’s fi rm commitment to the cause of Islamic da’wah, 
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locally and internationally, and vowed to vigorously support the cause of 
Islamic nations.10
It is undeniable that Islam is a major force in Southeast Asia since it 
is the offi  cial religion of Malaysia and Brunei Darussalam, the faith of 
some 90 percent of the Indonesian population and a large minority in the 
Philippines, " ailand and Singapore. In addition, Islam in Southeast Asia 
has been increasingly politicized as a result of development within the 
Islamic world. " erefore, it is quite reasonable to expect that Malaysia’s 
foreign policy would also be geared towards an active and serious 
commitment to the regional Islamic causes. Yet this commendable 
stand in the conduct of foreign policy is arguably adopted for more 
than religious reasons. Politically, it is primarily motivated by the desire 
to ensure the maintenance of peace and stability in the region, and to 
promote cooperation among the regional state. As such, ASEAN has 
always been regarded as the cornerstone of Malaysia’s foreign policy.11
Indeed, Malaysia’s active involvement in the aff airs of the Islamic world is 
not confi ned to the political arena. At the economic front, Malaysia believes 
that the economic growth and development of member countries has 
currently become more diffi  cult, especially by the manipulative policies of 
the developed nations, and the problem of indebtedness. Malaysia, under 
its fi rst Premier, contributed signifi cantly to the establishment of Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB) which aimed at accumulating wealth from 
the rich members to help the poor and less developed, and, at the time, to 
ensure that Muslim economy could compete with other developed and 
developing economies.12 Closer ties with the Muslim world, both Arab 
and non-Arab, holds the attractive potential for greater commercial, 
trade and investment linkages with these states. Dr.Mahathir echoed this 
point clearly when he remarked that Malaysia should take advantage of 
the presence of 900 million Muslims in the world.13 Pakistan and Iraq, 
for instance, are among the biggest buyers of Malaysia’s palm oil.14 
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In terms of investment, closer ties with the Gulf States, and institutions 
like that of IDB, Saudi Fund and the Kuwaiti Fund for Arab Economic 
Development (KFAED), has injected funds for Malaysia’s various 
development plans. Bilateral loans from these institutions had, for 
example, totaled by the end of 1984 M$390.3 million (Saudi Fund: 
M$25.5 million and Kuwait Fund: M$137.8 million) (Ahmad, M. Yusof, 
1990: 308).  Indeed, closer political and religious ties with these countries 
led to medium and long-term economic benefi ts for Malaysia. For 
instance, through cultivating closer relations with the Arab world, the 
administration of the second Premier, Tun Abdul Razak, got a M$300 
million loan to fi nance various developmental projects in the country, 
and was indeed instrumental in the success of its New Economic Policy 
(NEP).15
Tun Razak’s era was very much known for its domestic economic 
restructuring (NEP) to address the economic imbalance among the 
Malaysian communities that was one of the prime reasons for the 
communal crisis in 1969. Consequently, Tun Razak continued to enhance 
its active and closer participation with the Muslim world especially ‘the 
oil-powers’, that could benefi t Malaysia economically. Indeed, the policies 
he formulated locally and globally were depicted in terms of national 
objectives. 
Malaysia’s closest cooperation and active support to the Arab world 
during Tun Razak administration had clearly been of great benefi t to 
the country both politically and economically. In the economic fi eld, 
Malaysia gained many trade opportunities off ered by the Gulf States like 
Qatar, Oman, UEA and Bahrain, mainly through importing its rubber, 
wood, and food, including canned one.16
In a speech in the House of Representatives in March 1975, Tun Razak 
maintained that his tour to the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia was very 
successful. He proudly said that a capital of $300 million from the Arab 
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countries would be utilized for the Medical Faculty of the National 
University of Malaysia (UKM), the National Technological Institute, 
the construction of a port in Kuantan and the funding of an electrical 
power project in Terengganu River. Another $100 million from the UAE 
would also be used to fi nance projects of mutual interest. With regard 
to the political aspect, Tun Razak stressed that Malaysia managed to 
strengthen unity with the Arab countries through its fi rm stand against 
Israeli occupation of Arab lands.17
Malaysia pro-Arab attitude in the Palestinian issue during Tun Razak was 
clearly manifested in its unreserved support for the Arab cause in the West 
Asian confl ict. All the joint-communiquies, signed between Malaysia and 
the Arab States during the Premier’s visit of January 1975, reiterated the 
conviction that the liberation of occupied Arab lands and the restoration 
of the rights of the Palestinian people were prerequisites for a lasting 
peace in the Middle East. ! ey also reaffi  rmed their recognition of the 
PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.18 Indeed, the 
government active association with the Islamic world, like the successful 
hosting of the Fifth Islamic Conference in Kuala Lumpur, had really 
enhanced its image abroad, but particularly at home among the Malay-
Muslims. ! is is indeed a crucial part of the government’s drive of image 
rebuilding especially in the post 1969 riot.
Malaysia involvement with the Islamic nations is not only confi ned to 
the political and economic spheres. Association with the Muslim world 
enabled Malaysia to promote greater cooperation in the fi elds of culture, 
education, science and technology. For instance, Tun Abdul Razak signed 
in 1975 a treaty with the Gulf States to exchange scientists, professors, 
students, journalists and sport elite. In the same year, he also concluded an 
agreement on economic, technical and cultural cooperation with Oman 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).19 ! e next administration under 
the leadership of Tun Hussein Onn continued this policy by signing in 
1977 an economic, scientifi c and technical agreement with Libya and the 
Arab Republic of Egypt.20
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Beside the principles of non-alignment and regionalism, the third Premier 
of Malaysia, Tun Hussein also adopted the concept of Islamic solidarity. 
! us he upgraded relations with the Muslim countries, particularly the 
Arab states, and enhanced participation in the International Islamic 
Organizations, especially in the OIC. At the inaugural meeting of 
the Regional Islamic Organization of Southeast Asia and the Pacifi c 
(RISEAP) on November 10, 1980, Tun Hussein stressed his government’s 
commitment towards Islam and the Islamic world. In his words;
“Although the Malaysian society is multi-religious, Islam has been 
made the offi  cial religion of the country.  e Federal and State 
Constitution guarantee the freedom of worship. Our national 
ideology, the Rukun Negara, provides for the belief in God. Malaysia 
has always supported the cause of Islam. It takes an active part in 
the Islamic Conference and the Islamic Development Bank. It is also 
active in the propagation of Islamic faith. We believe that material 
development alone cannot ensure the [health of a] nation; we also 
attach great importance to spiritual development”.21 
Admitting that material benefi ts were one of the priceless rewards 
of brotherly ties with the Islamic world, Tun Hussein continued Tun 
Razak’s pragmatic strategy of using Islam as a binding force, which was 
instrumental for Malaysian development (Nair, Shanti 1997). Identifi ed 
as a growing source of loans and investment capital for Malaysia, relations 
with the ‘oil powers’ were upgraded to underscore the Prime Minister’s 
belief that Islam was indeed capable of bringing about prosperity 
and progress. Such ties were actively sought, and provided substantial 
resources for the ! ird Malaysian Plan, with wide publicity for loans and 
agreements signed with countries like Libya, Saudi Arabia and Iraq.22
Tun Hussein’s fi rst visit outside ASEAN, was to Saudi Arabia. In 1977, 
Malaysia obtained M$193 million from the Saudi Fund for Development, 
and concluded several important trade, technology and scientifi c 
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agreements with Iraq. By 1978, total Arab loans to Malaysia stood at 
M$329 million. Under the ! ird Malaysian Plan, Libya provided M$25 
million towards development projects while Saudi Arabia gave a M$200 
million loan pact (Nair, Shanti 1997).
Malaysia, under Tun Hussein, had been commended for the propagation 
of Islam, and the development of Islamic world. PERKIM, still under 
the patronage of the ex-Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, was the 
most successful benefi ciary of this form of International funding with a 
gift of M$12 million from Libya. In 1978, Kuwait pledged M$15 million 
to the Perak State Religious Department, and Saudi Arabia pledged 
M$3.5 million for a proposed religious school.23
Reviewing Malaysia’s political scenario under Tun Hussein’s 
administration, one would realize that his government’s commitment to 
the cause of Islam, locally and internationally, was inevitable and urgent. 
! e growth of global Islamic resurgence in the second half of the 1970’s, 
whose impact was vividly noticed in Malaysia, posed a serious challenge 
to Tun Hussein’s government.24 ! e rise of transnational da’wah activity, 
as a sequence of the global Islamic resurgence, spearheaded by three 
most important da’wah organizations: ABIM, Jama’at Tabligh and Dar 
al-Arqam, had further challenged the power of the government (Means, 
Gordon P., 1970: 71-74).
! e strength and growth of such non-government organizations 
continued to challenge the domestic and external policies of the Malaysian 
government throughout the 1970’s. Despite a renewed initiative to give 
attention to Malaysia’s relation with Islamic nations in the Middle East 
and Africa, it was clear that the government had yet to work out an 
appropriate response to the impact of International Islamic revivalism 
on Malay-Muslim society (Nair, Shanti, 1997: 72). Curtailment of this 
movement was at any rate expected to be injurious to the image of the 
government. ! us it felt that closer active commitment to the Islamic 
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cause, like the Palestinian problem, would be somewhat imperative and 
urgent to secure legitimacy amidst the challenge of the world-wide 
revival of Islam in the 1970’s.
! e Malaysian government under Tun Hussein consistently and fi rmly 
believed that any solution to the problem of the Middle East had to take 
into account the rights of the concerned Arab states to regain their lost 
territories. It further insisted that no solution in the Middle East could 
be achieved without full consideration to the legitimate aspirations of the 
Palestinian people, and their inalienable rights to return to their homes 
and properties, and to achieve self-determination, national independence 
and sovereignty.
As already mentioned, Tun Hussein’s policies were somewhat a 
continuation of Tun Razak’s pragmatic initiatives, especially his pro-
Arab policy. Realizing that foreign trade and investment were of greater 
importance for Malaysia, Tun Hussein consolidated and intensifi ed 
relations with Muslim countries in West Asia. He visited Saudi Arabia 
in 1976, Egypt and Libya in January 1977, and Turkey and Iraq in 
February 1977.25 Various agreements had been concluded between the 
parties concerned during these visits, thus developed a great momentum 
and impetus in the cooperation between Malaysia and those countries in 
the fi elds of trade, economy, technology, culture and science.26 From the 
offi  cial communiqué issued at the close of every visit, one could clearly 
see, beside mutual cooperation, the urgency of the Middle East issue, 
particularly the cause of the Arab-Palestinians and their plight.
! e resurgence of Islam had motivated, if not forced, UMNO, the 
leading Malay party, to be on its guard because the revival has in fact 
being translated into political benefi t by its rival, PAS. Consequently, the 
government had to upgrade its commitment to Islam, and to treat Islamic 
issues more eff ectively in order not to off end Malay-Muslim sensibilities. 
Islamization was then taken by the government as a means to attract 
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Malay voters in the election amidst PAS challenge. Tun Hussein once 
commented;
“You may wonder why we spend so much money on Islam. You may 
think it is a waste of money. If we don’t we face two major problems. 
First, Party Islam (PAS) will get at us.  e party will and does claim 
that we’re not religious and the people will lose faith.  e second, we 
have to strength the faith of the people which is another way to fi ght 
communism”.27
Reviewing the address of His Majesty at the opening of the Fifth 
Parliamentary Meeting in March 16, 1981, one could also note the 
considerable Islamic dimension of the Malaysian foreign policy. In his 
address the King emphasized:
“My government is also concerned with International developments, 
such as the continuing confl ict between Islamic states in West Asia and 
the Palestinian issue.  e external aggression against Afghanistan is 
fraught with dark implications. In the light of these developments, 
my government is currently involved in several International 
organizations with a view to settling these disputes. I am also pleased 
that my government has been accorded high standing amongst Islamic 
nations. My government will also continue with eff orts to consolidate 
coorperation and ties amongst Islamic nations.”28
Dr. Mahathir the fourth Premier later shifted Malaysia’s foreign policy 
from being essentially pro-Western and ASEAN-based to one with an 
increasing International profi le and identifi cation with the ! ird World 
problems.29 Dr. Mahathir succeeded in bringing Malaysia to the fore, 
especially among the ! ird World countries, by voicing forcefully their 
aspiration and aims. Altaf Gauhar, Secretary General of the ! ird World 
Foundation, acknowledged Malaysia as a champion of the less developed 
! ird World countries (Ahmad, Aziz Zariza, 1997: 137).
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Signifi cantly, Islam assumed growing prominence under Mahathir’s 
administration. ! e cause of Islam can rightly be said to constitute the 
second most important dimension in his foreign policy throughout the 
1980’s. Dr. Mahathir’s placement of the OIC and “pan-Islamism” at 
the second rung of Malaysia’s foreign policy priority list in 1981 clearly 
testifi es to this fact (Ahmad, M. Yusof, 1990: 170). ! roughout the 1980’s, 
Malaysia increasingly sought to identify itself with International Islamic 
issues, and as an activist member of the global Islamic community. Both 
government and UMNO rhetoric increasingly referred to Malaysia as an 
Islamic nation. 
Undoubtedly Mahathir, like his predecessors, continued to deal with 
Islam as an important policy tool to protect, promote and secure 
Malaysia’s national interests within the International world of Islam,30 
but no radical departure occurred from the one already laid down by the 
previous administration. Perhaps it is in the Palestinian issue that a strong 
sense of continuity could be noted. ! ough there was no radical departure 
with regard to the government’s attitude towards this issue, some new 
assertiveness could be noticed during Mahathir administration. 
! e Pro-Islamic orientation of Mahathir is also evident in foreign policy. 
It is apparent that Mahathir’s leaning towards the Muslim world is even 
more pronounced than his predecessors. Dr. Mahathir’s declaration, in 
1983, that Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth were no 
longer as important to Malaysia as the Muslim Bloc overtly verifi es the 
above fact (Mutalib, Hussin, 1995: 32). 
Dr Mahathir’s high commitment to the Islamic cause and the Islamization 
policy is partly motivated by his desire of image enhancement at home 
and abroad, particularly to maintain the legitimacy of UMNO in the 
eyes of the Malay-Muslim populace (Mutalib, Hussin, 1995: 30). Dr. 
Mahathir’s commitment to the Islamic cause, particularly the Palestinian 
issue, had become even more pronounced and assertive with his co-option 
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of Anwar Ibrahim, the former President of ABIM, into the government 
in 1982. 
Another factor for this commitment to the usage of Islam as a policy 
tools, is to maintain socio-political and religious stability amidst the 
challenge of da’wah movements resulting from the global Islamic 
resurgence since the late 1970’s. ! e Iranian revolution, which took place 
at the close of 1979, posed a serious challenge to many ‘secular-oriented’ 
Muslim movements including Malaysia. Being fully aware of the power 
and pride of this movement, the government decided not to leave it to 
the manipulation or exploitation of the opposition Islamic parties. Since 
curtailment was expected at any rate to be injurious to the government 
reputation, it was thus persuaded, if not compelled, to respond to Islamic 
demands, especially to review its domestic Islamic policies, and its image 
within the Islamic world. 
Under the leadership of Dr. Mahathir, Malaysia’s pro-Palestinian 
attitude became even more vocal and positive than that adopted by his 
predecessors. In spite of the challenge of Islamic revivalism, Dr. Mahathir’s 
era witnessed increasing awareness among various civil society groups31 
of Islamic issues, thus motivated his government to be more assertive 
towards them. Hence, in analyzing the role of the Malaysian government 
towards the Palestinian issue in the 1980’s, one would not fail to note the 
increasing competition and collaboration between it and the civil society 
groups in Malaysia. 
Shortly after assuming offi  ce, in October 1981, Dr. Mahathir decided to 
upgrade the PLO representation in the country to full diplomatic status. 
Malaysia was thus the only country in the Southeast Asia region, and 
the second country in the world, to do so.32 ! e Foreign Minister of 
Malaysia, Tan Sri Ghazali Shafi e, in his statement on the occasion of 
Al-Aqsa Day, in August 21, 1981, pledged Malaysian support for the 
cause of the Palestinians by saying, “Malaysia will continue to call on 
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the International community to pressure Israel to withdraw from all 
Arab territories, including Holy Bait Al-Maqdis, until the rights of the 
Palestinian people to a sovereign state in their homeland is recognized 
and fulfi lled”.33 He also proudly referred to the recent decision to upgrade 
the status of the PLO representation in Malaysia by saying: 
“It gives a great pleasure for me to announce that, consistent with our 
policy on the Palestinian question and our desire to further strengthen 
relation with the PLO, the government has decided to extend full 
diplomatic status to the offi  ce and the representative of the PLO in 
Kuala Lumpur, as accorded to other resident diplomatic missions 
here.”34
! e increasing role of the Malaysian government on the Palestinian 
issue could be clearly noted throughout the 1980’s. Apart from its annual 
contribution of US$5,000 (in 1981) to the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA) operating in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
the Malaysian government contributed M$100,000 in 1982 to the camps’ 
dwellers, following the Israel invasion of Lebanon (Nair, Shanti 1997: 
207). Humanitarian aid came in other forms like medical assistance, 
scholarships for Palestinian students at Malaysian Universities and 
occupational training centers.35
Another most recent disturbing challenge to the Ummah was the 
costly and long war between Iran and Iraq (1980-1988) that may be 
regarded as one of the most tragic events in Islamic history. It resulted 
in heavy causalities in terms of human live and fi nancial costs, and to a 
certain degree, threatened both the Middle East and world stability. ! e 
Malaysian government strongly believed in a political solution to the 
Iran-Iraq confl ict, and the issue to her was purely political.36
Deputy Premier, Datuk Musa, assured that Malaysia, being a non-Arab 
country which is not located in the area or confl ict, and as a member 
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of the OIC, would off er to undertake serious and long term eff orts 
to fi nd peace in the area of confl ict. He commented on the stand of 
his government on the confl ict as follows: “Considering that Malaysia 
maintains close relations with both Iran and Iraq, we would like to off er 
ourselves to fi nd a solution to the confl ict without appearing to take sides 
with either side”.37
It is also interesting to note that awareness of the Palestinian issue had 
widely spread throughout the 1980’s among the Malaysian public. It was 
largely spearheaded by the government itself, the Malaysian dailies, and 
the non-governmental movement such as ABIM and PERKIM.
In November 1986, the over sensitivity to the PLO cause was again 
repeated. Following an offi  cial visit to Singapore by President Chaim 
Herzog of Israel, Malaysia, Indonesia and Brunei submitted an offi  cial 
protest to the Singapore government that chastised this visit for its lack 
of sensitivity towards the feeling of its Muslim neighbors. Anti Singapore 
rallies were held in Johor, and effi  gies of Premier Lee Kuan Yew were 
burned by protestors.38 # e rally organizer submitted a memorandum 
to the government calling for stronger actions ranging from a break 
in diplomatic ties39 to a review of the water supply agreement with 
Singapore.40 In response to these widespread demonstrations organized 
by various civil society groups, the government temporarily withdrew its 
High Commissioner from Singapore, and the relations between the two 
countries were strained for a while.
Another bold and commendable step taken by the Malaysian government 
was its decision of 12 January 1989; to elevate the offi  ce of the PLO 
in Malaysia to a full fl edged Embassy of the state of Palestine.41 # is 
movement clearly confi rms the government aggressive posture in 
supporting the Intifadha, and was in line with its previous recognition of 
the state of Palestine.42 # e elevation was, in fact, yet another refl ection 
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of Malaysia’s strong and unequivocal support to the just demands of the 
Palestinian for the self-determination and independence.
At the 18th Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference in Riyadh, Saudi 
Arabia on March 13, 1989, the Minister of Foreign Aff airs explained in 
details the position of the Malaysian government in this respect. In his 
words;
“Malaysia is proud to be amongst the fi rst countries to recognize the 
State of Palestine. As a manifestation of our support, Malaysia has 
upgraded the PLO offi  ce in Kuala Lumpur to full Embassy status. 
Malaysia earnestly calls the UN secretary General and the members 
of the UN Security Council to continue taking the necessary eff orts 
for the early convening of an international peace conference in the 
Middle East. Israel must be brought to its senses that they are going 
against the tide for peace.  eir continued ‘iron fi st’ policy would not 
serve their objective but instead leads to further suff ering”.43
Another important development during Dr. Mahathir’s administration 
was the signing of peace agreement between the PLO and Israel which 
had signifi cant impact not only for the Palestinians and Israelis but the 
Arab States in the Middle East.44 Commenting on the signing of the 
peace pact, Dr. Mahathir hoped that it would become an important 
milestone towards the absolute peace in the Middle East. Malaysian 
Foreign Minister, Datuk Abdullah Ahmad Badawi also commended the 
Palestinian leadership for its realistic and courageous act in leading the 
Palestinian people towards a new and promising future.45
Support for the Accords, of the concessions made, and the process 
were not free from criticism. " e repeated public posturing of all sides 
has discredited the process, not to mention putting into question the 
possibility of achieving peace, at least in the short-term.
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Dr. Mahathir also repeatedly voiced out his doubt and criticism on 
Israel’s sincerity with regard to the peace agreement.46 On December 13, 
1994, when delivering his speech at the 8th Islamic Summit Conference 
in Casablanca, Morocco, he expressed his disappointment by saying;
“Most of us, I believe, are unhappy with the progress of the peace 
process in Palestine.  e Israelis have been dilatory and insincere. But 
wrecking the peace process will not get us anywhere. Indeed if the 
sabotage succeeds it will force us to begin all over again. And how 
can we believe that the strategy which got us nowhere after decades 
of costly struggle will achieve success if we begin again? I appeal to 
all Palestinian patriot of all shades and political leanings to unite 
and strengthen their resolve so that the small gains that they have 
made can be consolidated and enhanced. In time, you will achieve 
your objective”.47
Before his retirement, Dr. Mahathir made another immense contribution 
to the Islamic ummah with the successful hosting of the 10th OIC Summit 
Conference in Putrajaya, Malaysia. Reviewing his opening address, one 
could note the extensive Islamic dimension of the Malaysian foreign 
policy notably the Palestinian issue. In his words;
“To begin with, the government of all the Muslim countries can 
close ranks and have a common stand if not on all issues, at least on 
some major ones, such as on Palestine. We are all Muslims. We are 
all oppressed. We are all being humiliated. But we who have been 
raised by Allah above our fellow Muslims to rule our countries have 
never really tried to act in concert in order to exhibit at our level the 
brotherhood and unity that Islam enjoins upon us”.48
! roughout the opening remark, he championed the theme of Islamic 
unity vigorously and assertively. He also declared courageously that the 
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Jews and their proxy are the main causes for the current Palestinian 
plight. In one of his statements he said;
“We are actually very strong. 1.3 billion people cannot be simply 
wiped out.   e Europeans killed 6 million Jews out of 12 million. 
But today the Jews rule this world by proxy.  ey get others to fi ght 
and die for them”.49
Remarkably, the Islamic issue, particularly the Palestinian Issue, during 
the Mahathir administration, had been receiving an overwhelming 
attention from the government and public. It is apparent that Mahathir’s 
commitment to the Islamic issue was even more pronounced and 
assertive than that of his predecessors. Inevitably, the co-option of Anwar 
Ibrahim, ABIM’s president, in the government before the 1982 General 
Election, had intensifi ed the collaboration between government and the 
civil society groups, particularly ABIM and PERKIM, in the Ummatic 
issue. ! e government’s vigorous eff orts to enhance its Islamic image 
internally and internationally, was no doubt, partly motivated by its desire 
to preempt and defuse the consistent charge of PAS, and other political 
and non-political Islamic-based groups, that it had not doing enough to 
support the cause of Islam at home and abroad.
CONCLUSION
Malaysia’s commitment and support to the Islamic cause has, however, 
been perceived diff erently by various groups. Many contest that the role 
of Islam in Malaysian foreign policy should not be viewed as a major 
shift towards the ideologization of religion in International relations. 
Many suggest that Malaysia’s support for the Islamic cause is largely due 
to its cautious pragmatism and humanitarian concern rather than to its 
religious commitment. For the government it is indeed undeniable that 
co-religionism has provided domestic political mileage for the ruling 
Malay party, and UMNO leaders have also given the Palestinian plight 
an international dimension, not just an Islamic focus, because it involves 
universal human rights.
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  e pluralist nature of the Malaysian society has, however, posed a dilemma 
for UMNO. While on the one hand, the party has to accommodate the 
multi racial aspirations of the National Coalition (BN), it consistently 
needs, on the other hand, to demonstrate its commitment to Islam in 
order to maintain the support of the Malay-Muslims.  erefore, being 
pragmatic, the government has to support the Islamic cause in order not 
to off end the Malay religious sensibilities, and local UMNO politicians 
and leaders have consequently tended to emphasize their loyalty to the 
Malay and Islamic expectations.  is dilemma has triggered PAS, with 
its forthright commitment to Islam, to charge UMNO with little and 
reluctant support for Islam, and to denounce its presumed “excessive 
leniency” in yielding to the demands of its non-Malay and non-Muslim 
parties in the National Coalition.
Doubtless, Islam has constituted a powerful weapon in the struggle for 
political supremacy in Malaysia. To face intra-Malay rivalry, Islam has 
been used by successive Malaysian Prime Ministers as a continuing source 
of political legitimacy, and a shield against external interference in Malay 
politics. In their literature and activities since independence, the themes 
of Malayism and Islamism are, therefore, tightly fused together. As such, 
Malaysia since Tunku has pursued a pro-Muslim stand in its foreign 
policy. Curtailment of Islam may at any rate injure UMNO’s image 
among the Malay-Muslim voters, thus the support of the Palestinian 
cause becomes inevitable and of utmost political necessity. Due to the 
intra-Malay political rivalry, especially from PAS, the government has 
also been fully aware of the power of Islamic resurgence at home and 
abroad, thus has given its full support to the Palestinian struggle.
In analyzing Malaysian attitude and role to the Islamic cause, I venture 
to argue that Malaysia was more politically and symbolically committed 
to the Palestinian issue. Signifi cantly, Malaysia’s stance on the issue was 
consistently in line with that of other OIC member-states, and on the 
same track with the international community, especially as represented 
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in the United Nations. For instance in case of Palestinian issue it does 
not seem to be comparable with that of the Arab nations. For the Arab 
nations, the Palestinian issue has defi nitely become part and parcel of 
their daily lives, and was perhaps their most important concern. Hence 
their role in it is doubtless more remarkable and signifi cant than that of 
Malaysia whose acquaintance and commitment is, rather recent, and of 
more political nature, though the religious factor played a role in igniting 
the sympathy of the Malay-Muslims with the Palestinian tragedy.
! e study also suggests that the role of the Malaysian government 
concerning the Palestinian issue was largely motivated by pragmatic 
considerations resulting from an interplay between various factors: 
political, economic, religious and humanitarian. ! ey have been, fi rst 
and foremost, instrumental in mobilizing support among the Malay 
population. Secondly, they help to preempt and diff use Malay-Muslim 
opposition especially that of PAS, and, thirdly, they enhance the image of 
Malaysia within the Islamic world, through its membership of the OIC. 
Closer ties with the Muslim world, especially with the Arab nations, 
have, moreover, provided greater commercial, trade and investment 
opportunities for the country’s various development plans. Within the 
Malaysian context, ‘Islamism’ has also come to be seen as a catalyst that 
could pressurize the government to be more sensitive and responsive to 
the Palestinian issue, since its claim to uphold democracy dictated due 
attention and consideration to public opinion in any policy formulation. 
! e Malaysian government was, therefore, bound by these pragmatic 
considerations to maintain a pro-Muslim and a pro-Palestinian attitude 
in its foreign policy.
! ough many claim that Islam has never been an overriding factor in 
Malaysia’s support of the Islamic cause, its role in this respect is indeed, 
highly commendable. It is hoped that in the near future Malaysia will 
engage more constructively in the Islamic issue, especially by giving 
its religious dimension top priority. ! is aspect of religiosity should, 
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no doubt, be seriously taken into account since Islam is the main 
political force in Malaysian politics. It is only with the full realization 
of the direct relevance of Islam that the Islamic issues could be resolved 
comprehensively. ! e ideals of Islamic brotherhood and solidarity, if 
understood properly, would motivate Muslims in Malaysia and elsewhere 
to assist their brothers all over the Islamic world.
It may be presumed that Malaysia in the foreseeable future place a greater 
emphasis on Islam in its International relations. ! is will certainly be so 
when the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) assumes greater 
importance and the concept of universal Islamic brotherhood is fully 
comprehended by all Muslims. Malaysia, where Islam plays active role in 
the national life, could accelerate its commitment to the Ummatic cause 
through sending volunteers to the battle ground, and by joining UN-
peace keeping troops that may be sent to the area to help in resolving 
the problem. In addition, Malaysia, with its pioneering role in the 
! ird World, is expected to continue to persuade the UN to ensure the 
implementation of resolutions on the crisis, and to urge all member-states 
of the OIC to forge a united front to help solve the Islamic issues.   
Remarkably, the OIC ranks high on the list of Malaysia’s foreign policy 
undertakings. Being a Muslim country, Malaysia is obliged to support 
the Islamic cause. To ignore this obligation will not only erode her 
Islamic credentials within the community of Islamic nations, but also 
domestically among the Malay-Muslim sector of the populace. ! e 
latter could aff ect signifi cantly the legitimacy of UMNO as the protector 
of Islam and Malay-Muslims in the country. As such, the Malaysian 
government had, and will continue to play an active role concerning the 
Islamic issues to ensure the well being of the Ummah at large, and its own 
survival at the national level.
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